Integrated Defence Planning: From National Security Policy to Force Planning

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Outline

• Roles of the armed forces in the security strategy (Bartlett’s model)
• Alternative approaches to defence planning
• Long-term defence planning (Capabilities-based planning)
• Building blocks in allied force planning; security sector capabilities
Armed forces in the security strategy

• Ends
• Means
• Strategy
• Risk
• Security environment
• Resource constraints
• Possible roles of the armed forces
Objectives of the national security policy

Strategies for contribution of the armed forces

Missions of the armed forces, 1...m

Tasks of the armed forces, 1...t

Capabilities, 1...c

Force mix, 1...f

Allied and other external requirements

Affordable force structure & Acceptable planning risks

Yes

No

Costing the force structure
Assessing planning risk
Alternative approaches to defence planning

1. Top-down
2. Bottom-up
3. Scenario
4. Threat
5. Mission
6. Hedging
7. Technology
8. Fiscal
Objectives of the national security policy

Strategies for contribution of the armed forces

Missions of the armed forces, 1...m

Tasks of the armed forces, 1...t

Capabilities, 1...c

Force mix, 1...f

Allied and other external requirements

Structure Manning Training

Weapons & Equipment Stockpiles

C4ISR Infrastructure

Doctrine Readiness

Costing the force structure

Assessing planning risk

Affordable force structure & Acceptable planning risks
Planning horizons

• Long-term planning – 10-30 years
• Mid-term planning – 4-8 years (6 years in NATO and a number of member countries; DPQ/IOS)
• Short-term planning (budget, procurement plans, plans for training and exercises, etc.)
Long-term defence planning

- Objectives
- Place
- Best-practice model
Scenario set in the defence planning process in Canada

1. Search and rescue in Canada
2. Disaster relief in Canada
3. International humanitarian assistance
4. Surveillance/control of Canadian territory and approaches
5. Evacuation of Canadians overseas
6. Peace support operations (Peacekeeping)
7. Aid of the civil power/Assistance to law enforcement agencies
   7. a. Chemical Weapon Variant
Scenario set, Canada (cont.)

8. National sovereignty/interests enforcement
9. Peace support operations (Peace enforcement)
   9. a. Failed State Variant
10. Defence of North America
    10. a. Radiological Weapon Variant
    10. b. Cyber Attack Variant
11. Collective Defence
Partial algorithm

• Tasks to accomplish a mission in a scenario
• Effects needed to achieve the task
• Enabling concepts
• Capabilities needed to implement effects
• Capability Requirements
• (NATO - TOA)
Building blocks in force planning

• General framework
• NATO and EU context
• Planning in the context of the national security sector
CAPABILITIES
Task: Control of the Airspace

1. Recognized Air Picture (Air surveillance)
2. Command and control (awareness, early warning, decision making, communications, navigation, etc.)
3. Defeat/ Repel enemy aircraft
4. Sustained operations (Logistics)
Capability Requirements vs. Resources – Approach I

I Defining required capabilities

II Designing “type units” (unit models) with detailed description of unit mission, organisation, manning, weapon systems and training levels

III Costing type units

IV Optimising the mix of type units
Air Force Example
Task: Airspace Control
UNIT TYPES - Capability 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Qnt.</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U1</td>
<td>Fighters type A</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>C1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U2</td>
<td>Fighters type B</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>C2</td>
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<td>AD Sq. type A</td>
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<td>P4</td>
<td>C4</td>
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<td>U5</td>
<td>AD Sq. type B</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>P5</td>
<td>C5</td>
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<td>U6</td>
<td>AD Sq. type C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>P6</td>
<td>C6</td>
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</table>
**Example: Task 1**

**Force Mix Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mix</th>
<th>Combat Units</th>
<th>Combat Support</th>
<th>Combat Service Support</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>Associated risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>2<em>U1 + 1</em>U4</td>
<td>1 Command post + 1 signal battalion</td>
<td>2 maint. sqs + 1 log battalion</td>
<td>CM1</td>
<td>R1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>1<em>U1+1</em>U4+2*U5</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>CM2</td>
<td>R2</td>
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<tr>
<td>M3</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>CM3</td>
<td>R3</td>
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Balancing Requirements and Resources

• Straightforward non-linear optimization problem regarding capability X:

  Choose Force Mix\(_i\) : Risk is minimal,

  \( \text{Resource Reqs} \leq \text{Expected Resources} \)

• 2 major complications

  – The resources available for capability X are not known in advance

  – Supplementarity of capabilities and tasks
Force planning in international/multi-agency context

• Specialization vs full-spectrum
• Interoperability
  – Readiness levels
  – …
Conclusion

• Politicians and experts
• Organizational processes
• Role of partnership

• Questions?